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This article develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the
accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the
internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous
taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality,
this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect),
falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and
falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering
presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation
theories of remembering.
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Memory errors play important roles in both psychology and philosophy. In psychology, they
provide insight into the mechanisms at work in successful and unsuccessful remembering (e.g.,
Roediger, 1996). In philosophy, they serve as test-cases for accounts of the difference between
genuine and merely apparent remembering (e.g., Bernecker, 2010). But there is little consensus
in either psychology or philosophy on the definitions of and relationships among different types of
memory error—we lack an adequate taxonomy of memory errors.
Drawing on the resources of philosophy but aiming for coherence with psychology, this article
develops a taxonomy designed to be consistent with recent simulation theories of remembering.
While such theories are increasingly influential (Shanton and Goldman, 2010; De Brigard, 2014a;
Michaelian, 2016b), the older causal theory of memory Martin and Deutscher (1966) remains
popular (e.g., Bernecker, 2010; Klein, 2015; Cheng and Werning, 2016; Debus, Forthcoming).
Indeed, basing her approach in part on the causal theory, Robins (2016a) has recently proposed
a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of two conditions: (1) the accuracy of the memory
representation and (2) the involvement of retained information in the production of that
representation. This article begins by arguing that, while the causalist taxonomy accommodates
several types of error, includingmisremembering, falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning,
it fails to accommodate others, namely, veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. The
article then develops an alternative simulationist taxonomy in which the reliability of the memory
process that produced the representation replaces the involvement of retained information
in the production of the representation. This initial simulationist taxonomy accommodates
misremembering and (veridical and falsidical) confabulation, but it does not provide an account
of (veridical and falsidical) relearning. The article therefore ultimately proposes a taxonomy of
memory errors in terms of three factors: (1) accuracy, (2) reliability, and (3) the “internality”
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(with respect to the remembering subject) of the memory
process. This taxonomy provides a plausible account of
the relationships among remembering and misremembering,
veridical and falsidical confabulation, and veridical and falsidical
relearning, while remaining consistent with the simulation
theory.
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly addressing two worries
that one might have about the general sort of taxonomy of
memory errors at issue here, whether simulationist or causalist.
First, one might suppose that, since a great deal is known
about the mechanisms underlying confabulation and other
types of memory error, we would be better off dispensing
with highly general conditions such as accuracy, reliability, and
internality and instead defining memory errors directly in terms
of their underlying neural bases. Given the wide variety of
conditions under which even a single type of memory error
may arise, however, it is unlikely to be feasible to construct
such a taxonomy (Hirstein, 2005). Second, recent accounts of
memory errors (e.g., Bortolotti and Cox, 2009; Fotopoulou,
2010; Droege, 2015; Fernández, 2015) have tended to emphasize
their potential adaptive benefits, and one might argue that
the accounts discussed here do not acknowledge such benefits.
The point of these taxonomies is not, however, to determine
whether or not memory errors are adaptive. The point is rather
to contribute to the conceptual clarity of investigations of the
adaptive significance and underlying mechanisms of various
types of memory errors.
1. THE CAUSALIST TAXONOMY
The starting-point for Robins’ development of the causalist
taxonomy is the contrast between confabulation1 and (what she
refers to as)misremembering.
1.1. Confabulation and Misremembering
Robins takes confabulation, on the one hand, to be exemplified
by “lost in the mall”-style experiments, in which subjects are
induced to remember events that they never experienced (Loftus
and Pickrell, 1995). This sort of memory error, she says, reflects
“no influence of retained information from a particular past
event” (Robins, 2016a, p. 434). Since confabulated memory
representations may be built up from components originating
in experience of different past events, what is intended here
is clearly that confabulation reflects no influence of retained
information from the particular past event described by the
confabulated representation. She takes misremembering, on
the other hand, to be exemplified by the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) effect, in which subjects who have studied
a list of thematically-related words remember non-presented
but thematically-consistent words (Deese, 1959; Roediger and
McDermott, 1995). This sort of memory error, according to
Robins, “relies on successful retention of the targeted event”
(Robins, 2016a, p. 434).
1Robins is concerned with confabulation only insofar as it is a memory error. The
present article follows her in this, i.e., it is not concerned with nonmemorial forms
of confabulation or with the relationship between nonmemorial and memorial
forms of confabulation.
This way of describing the contrast between confabulation and
misremembering is meant to make it analogous to the contrast
between perceptual hallucination, in which the subject forms a
representation which does not correspond to the scene before
his eyes, and perceptual illusion, in which the subject forms a
representation which does correspond to the scene before his
eyes in some respects but fails to correspond to it in others. The
analogy between the confabulation/misremembering distinction
and the hallucination/illusion distinction will play an important
role in the argument of Sections 2–3. For now, the point is that, as
Robins conceives of it, misremembering involves a combination
of success and failure: the subject retains information from
experience of the remembered event (success) but nevertheless
represents the event inaccurately (failure)2. Because it involves
this specific combination of success and failure, she claims,
neither the traditional causal theory of memory—according to
which successful remembering presupposes the existence of a
causal connection between the retrieved memory representation
and an earlier experience of the event it represents—nor more
recent constructive theories is able to explain its occurrence.
Traditional causal theorists adopt an essentially archival view
of memory, seeing it as “a preservative capacity that stores
discrete representations of particular past events” (Robins, 2016a,
p. 432). Since the archival view treats remembering as being
simply a matter of retrieving stored representations, it is able to
understandmemory errors only as resulting frommalfunctions of
the memory system. It is thus unable to explain the occurrence of
errors in which a representation is successfully stored, indicating
that the system is functioning properly, but in which the subject
nevertheless fails to form an accurate representation at the time
of retrieval. This analysis of the limits of a purely archival view
is persuasive; Robins’ analysis of the limits of the constructive
view is much less so. The constructive view, as she describes
it, holds that “all attempts at remembering—both successes
and errors—are outputs of a single, adaptive process by which
plausible representations are constructed at the time of recall”
(Robins, 2016a, p. 432). Distinguishing among several versions
of the constructive view, including connectionist (Sutton, 1998),
gist-based (Michaelian, 2011b), and simulationist [or what she
refers to as episodic hypothetical thought-based; (De Brigard,
2014a)] approaches, Robins argues that, despite the fact that it
was expressly designed to take memory errors into account, the
constructive view, like the archival view, is unable to explain the
occurrence of the particular error of misremembering.
Simulationism is increasingly prominent, and the focus
here will be on the ability of this particular version of the
constructive view to account for misremembering and other
errors. A number of distinct simulationist approaches have been
proposed, but they have in common that they see memory
2What Robins refers to as misremembering might equally be referred to as false
memory. Robins’ term will be retained here, both because it nicely suggests that
the error in question is possible only due to the subject’s capacity to successfully
recognize many presented items and because “false memory” can also be used to
refer to errors (e.g., “lost in the mall” cases) from which DRM and similar errors
are distinct. It is important to note that misremembering, as the term is used here,
refers to memory for something that was not experienced, rather than failure to
remember something that was experienced.
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as a special case of a more general capacity for mental time
travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), episodic hypothetical
thought (De Brigard, 2014a), or episodic imagination more
broadly (Michaelian, 2016b). The core idea is that, in episodic
remembering, the episodic memory system—or rather a broader
episodic construction system—draws on information acquired
during experience of past events to construct a simulation
of a target event from the subject’s personal past. Similarly,
in episodic future thinking, the episodic construction system
draws on information acquired during experience of past events
to construct a simulation of a future event and, in episodic
counterfactual thinking, the system draws on such information
to construct a simulation of a counterfactual past event. Just as
the system must be able to simulate a future or counterfactual
event without drawing on information originating in experience
of the target event (since the event has not been experienced), it
is able to simulate a past event without drawing on information
originating in experience of the event (though, since the event
has been experienced, it may do so). Successful remembering,
according to simulationism, does not presuppose the retention
of information from the subject’s experience of the remembered
event, and therefore—contra the causal theory—it does not
presuppose the existence of a causal connection between a
“retrieved” memory representation and an earlier experience of
the event it represents3.
Whereas the traditional causal theory is only able to see
memory errors as resulting from malfunctions of the system,
leaving it unable to explain the occurrence of misremembering,
Robins takes it that simulationism is only able to see memory
errors as byproducts of an imperfect but properly functioning
system, leaving it likewise unable to explain the occurrence of
misremembering. For the simulationist, neither successful nor
unsuccessful remembering need involve retention of a discrete
representation of the remembered event, but “[w]ithout appeal
to [a discrete representation], there is no way to constrain
one’s consideration of which details were most likely part of
that event” (Robins, 2016a, p. 443). Simulationism thus fails
to acknowledge the difference between misremembering, which
involves retention of information originating in experience of the
remembered event, and outright confabulation, which does not.
1.2. The Accuracy and Retention
Conditions
Seeking a compromise between the archival view and the
constructive view, Robins proposes a hybrid view. From the
archival view, she takes the idea that successful remembering
involves retention of information from the remembered event.
From the constructive view, she takes the idea that successful
remembering involves construction of an accurate representation
3While simulationism as such does not require the existence of a causal connection,
underwritten by the retention of information, between the retrieved representation
and the earlier experience, specific versions of simulationism may be able to
incorporate modified versions of the causal condition. De Brigard’s version of
simulationism (discussed in greater detail below), for example, may be compatible
with the claim that remembering necessarily involves a causal connection
underwritten by modifications of synaptic connections, rather than retention of
information in a more straightforward sense.
at the time of retrieval. These two conditions—retention
and accuracy—ground an intuitively appealing account of the
relationship between successful remembering, misremembering,
and confabulation. Successful remembering occurs when both
the retention condition and the accuracy condition are met.
Misremembering occurs when the retention condition is met but
the accuracy condition is not. Finally, confabulation occurs when
neither condition is met.
It is important to note that, while it may not be compatible
with traditional archival versions of the causal theory, Robins’
taxonomy is explicitly intended to be compatible with newer
constructive versions of the theory. Indeed, setting aside their
disagreement over the nature ofmemory traces, Robins’ retention
condition is equivalent to the conjunction of Martin and
Deutscher’s causal and memory trace conditions (see Section
2). Robins denies that successful remembering can be reduced
to the retrieval of a stored representation; but she takes it that
storage and retrieval of a representation—and hence a causal
connection with the remembered event—is essential to successful
remembering. Her taxonomy is thus causalist in character. As
such, it is incompatible with the simulation theory, which denies
that successful remembering requires retention of information
from experience of the remembered event.
2. PROBLEMS FOR THE CAUSALIST
TAXONOMY
Were we to accept the taxonomy, we would thus have reason
to abandon simulationism. But while the taxonomy may be
intuitively appealing, it is ultimately inadequate. An adequate
taxonomy will accommodate not only misremembering and
confabulation but a number of additional memory errors, and
Robins’ taxonomy is unable to do so.
2.1. Relearning
Retention and accuracy can be combined in four ways
(see Table 1). First, the subject retains information and
therefore retrieves an accurate representation; this is the
causalist account of successful remembering. Second, the
subject retains information but nevertheless retrieves an
inaccurate representation; this is the causalist account of
misremembering. Third, the subject does not retain information
and therefore retrieves an inaccurate representation; this is the
causalist analysis of confabulation. Finally, the subject does
not retain information but nevertheless retrieves an accurate
representation. This final combination is not discussed by Robins
in detail, but she does suggest that it corresponds to relearning.
Relearning, as the term is used in the relevant literature,
occurs in certain cases in which the subject’s memory of an event
depends entirely on an external prompt. Reading an entry in
one’s diary, for example, might enable one to remember an event
that one would otherwise be unable to remember. In some such
cases, one might be successfully remembering the event. But in
other cases, one might merely be parroting back the prompt, i.e.,
one might have relearnt the event. It is not immediately clear
whether relearning should, strictly speaking, be classified as a
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TABLE 1 | The causalist taxonomy of memory errors.
Retention Accuracy
Successful remembering Yes Yes
Misremembering Yes No
Relearning No Yes
Falsidical confabulation No No
memory error. Relearning (as philosophers use the term) is not
among the memory errors standardly studied by psychologists.
But relearning is clearly closely related to remembering, and,
while it is not natural to view relearning as an error if the
subject is aware that he is relearning, the same thing goes for
the other errors discussed here—in the cases with which we are
concerned, it is assumed that the subject takes himself to be
remembering. Hence it is appropriate to include it in a taxonomy
of memory errors. One desideratum for the taxonomy is thus to
distinguish between cases of successful remembering and cases
of relearning. Robins’ suggestion is that relearning occurs when
the the accuracy condition is met but the retention condition is
not. This suggestion cannot be right, however, for there is another
type of memory error in which the accuracy condition is met but
the retention condition is not, namely, veridical confabulation.
2.2. Veridical Confabulation
“Veridical confabulation” may sound like an oxymoron, because
“confabulation” sounds counterfactive: intuitively, it seems that
one can only confabulate something that is false. It is thus
unsurprising that many standard definitions of confabulation
build falsity into confabulation. In one early definition, Talland
describes a confabulation as a “false verbal statement about
facts” (Talland, 1961, p. 362). In another early definition, Berlyne
describes a confabulation as a “falsification of memory occurring
in clear consciousness in association with an organically derived
dementia” (Berlyne, 1972, p. 38). More recently, Berrios describes
confabulations along the same line as “inaccurate or false
narratives purporting to convey information about world or
self ” (Berrios, 2000, p. 348). Similarly, Robins asumes that
confabulations are inaccurate. But falsity should not be built into
confabulation, for one and the same confabulatory process might
lead to the formation of either an accurate (true) or an inaccurate
(false) representation.
Recall the analogy between the confabulation/
misremembering distinction and the hallucination/illusion
distinction. In Section 1, the analogy was introduced by saying
that the difference between hallucination and illusion is that,
in hallucination, the subject forms a representation which
does not correspond to the scene before his eyes, whereas,
in illusion, the subject forms a representation which does
correspond to the scene before his eyes in some respects
but fails to correspond to it in others. Though natural, this
way of describing the difference between hallucination and
illusion is inadequate, since it overlooks the possibility of
veridical hallucination, hallucination in which the subject’s visual
representation happens to correspond to the scene before his
eyes (e.g., Lewis, 1980). Most cases of hallucination will result
in inaccurate representations, so falsidical hallucination is the
norm. But hallucination might occasionally result in an accurate
representation, so the possibility of veridical hallucination must
be accommodated.
Veridical confabulation in memory is analogous to veridical
hallucination in perception. Most cases of confabulation
will result in inaccurate memory representations; falsidical
confabulation is the norm. But confabulation might occasionally
result in an accurate memory representation; the possibility of
veridical confabulation must be accommodated. In “lost in the
mall” experiments, for example, subjects are normally asked
to imagine events that are highly improbable but nevertheless
possible. Such an experiment will result in a confabulatory but
veridical representation should it turn out that the subject really
had experienced the relevant event. In many cases of clinical
confabulation, the confabulated representations are outright
incoherent and therefore impossible. But there are also cases of
clinical confabulation which produce representations which are
coherent and therefore possible. Again, such a case will involve a
confabulatory but veridical representation should it turn out that
the subject had in fact experienced the relevant event4.
What is needed, then, is a definition of confabulation that does
not assume that confabulated representations are inaccurate. One
standard way of distinguishing between veridical hallucination
and successful perception is to appeal to the absence, in the
former case, and the presence, in the latter case, of a causal
connection between the subject’s representation and the scene
before his eyes, and we might similarly hope that a condition
requiring a causal connection between the subject’s memory
representation and his original experience will provide a means
of distinguishing between veridical confabulation and successful
remembering. Indeed, Martin and Deutscher themselves invoke
the possibility of veridical confabulation to motivate a causal
condition on remembering (see Robins, 2016b). The idea, as they
put it, is that remembering an event requires that the subject’s
experience of it “must have been operative in producing a state
or successive states in him finally operative in producing his
representation” (Martin and Deutscher, 1966, p. 173). They later
clarify that the relevant state is a memory trace, which they view
as a “structural analog” of experience. Call a causal connection
that goes via a memory trace in the relevant manner a “trace
connection.” OnMartin andDeutscher’s approach, both veridical
and falsidical confabulation are characterized by the lack of a
trace connection between the memory representation and the
earlier experience.
This approach might give us a way distinguish between
successful remembering (which, if the causal theorist is right,
involves a trace connection) and veridical confabulation (which
does not). And it might distinguish between misremembering
(which, again, if the causal theorist is right, involves a trace
4In any real case of veridical confabulation, of course, the correspondence
between the confabulatory representation and the relevant past experience is
likely to be highly imperfect, but the same goes for many cases of successful
(nonconfabulatory) remembering. And, no matter how stringent a standard of
accuracy we adopt, the possibility of veridical confabulation will never vanish
entirely.
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connection) and falsidical confabulation (which does not).
But it does not distinguish between veridical confabulation
and relearning, neither of which involves a trace connection.
Martin and Deutscher do appeal to relearning to motivate
a refinement of the causal condition: where prompting
contributes to the production of the memory representation,
the subject’s experience of the relevant event “is operative
in producing the state (or successive set of states) in him
which is finally operative in producing the representation
in the circumstances in which he is prompted (Martin
and Deutscher, 1966, p. 185). But this just reiterates the
point made by the generic causal condition: the experience
must give rise to a memory trace which then contributes
to the production of the memory representation, even if
the prompt also contributes, i.e., there must be a trace
connection between the memory representation and the earlier
experience. The refined causal condition tells us how to
distinguish relearning from successful remembering, but it
does not tell us how to distinguish relearning from veridical
confabulation.
In light of the discussion above of the limits of the
causalist taxonomy, this should come as no surprise, for
Robins’ retention condition is roughly equivalent to Martin
and Deutscher’s trace connection condition. The difference
between them is simply that, whereas Martin and Deutscher
view traces as “structural analogs,” Robins understands
them in terms of retained information. Neither the causal
condition nor the retention condition provides a means of
simultaneously accommodating both veridical confabulation and
relearning.
2.3. Falsidical Relearning
There is another type of memory error that the taxonomy
is unable to accommodate, namely, falsidical relearning. The
discussion so far has assumed (with Robins) that relearning is
always veridical, but it can also be falsidical, i.e., it can result
in inaccurate memory representations. “Falsidical relearning,”
like “veridical confabulation,” may sound like an oxymoron,
because “(re)learning” sounds factive: intuitively, it seems that
one can only learn or relearn something that is true. But
regardless of how the term is ordinarily used, relearning
should not be treated as factive here, for the straightforward
reason that one and the same relearning process might lead
to the formation of either an accurate or an inaccurate
representation.
Cases of falsidical relearning are easy enough to generate: the
description of the diary case given above, for example, assumed
that the diary contained accurate records of the subject’s past,
but this need not be so, and in a variant of the case in which the
subject consults a diary containing inaccurate records, he will
undergo falsidical relearning. Just as it cannot simultaneously
accommodate veridical confabulation and veridical relearning,
since both satisfy the accuracy condition but not the retention
condition, the causalist taxonomy cannot simultaneously
accommodate falsidical confabulation and falsidical relearning,
since both satisfy neither the accuracy condition nor the retention
condition.
3. TOWARD A SIMULATIONIST TAXONOMY
One basic lesson of the argument of Section 2 is that the causalist
taxonomy simply does not include enough conditions. Because it
includes only two conditions—accuracy and retention—allowing
for four combinations, it can in principle account for the
relationships among successful remembering and at most three
types of memory error. Given that an adequate taxonomy must
account for the relationships among successful remembering
and at least five types of error—misremembering, veridical and
falsidical confabulation, and veridical and falsidical relearning—
we can assume that it will include at least three conditions. One
natural approach to producing such a taxonomy would be to
supplement the accuracy and retention conditions with a third
condition. Any taxonomy which includes the retention condition
would, however, be incompatible with simulationism, and this
section will therefore explore an alternative approach.
3.1. Confabulation
We saw above that, while it is tempting to define confabulation
in terms of falsity, there is good reason not to do so. Örulv
and Hydén, for example, describe confabulations as “as false
narrative or statements about world and/or self due to some
pathological mechanisms or factors, but with no intention of
lying” (Örulv and Hydén, 2006, p. 648). This builds falsity
into the definition, which we do not want to do. But it also
builds in a second factor, production of the representation
by a pathological mechanism or factor, and it thus begins to
get at an important feature of confabulation. Consider again,
the contrast between confabulation and relearning. Intuitively,
veridical relearning occurs in cases in which the subject seems
to remember, and to remember accurately, but in which he
himself contributes nothing to the production of his memory
representation, in the sense that he contributes no content to
the retrieved representation. Veridical confabulation, in contrast,
occurs in cases in which the subject seems to remember, and
to remember accurately, but in which he is just “making things
up,” in the sense that his memory representation is accurate with
respect to the target event only by chance. The difference between
falsidical relearning and falsidical confabulation can be described
in parallel terms. Falsidical relearning occurs in cases in which the
subject seems to remember, though to remember inaccurately,
and in which he himself contributes nothing to the production
of the memory representation, i.e., he contributes no content to
the retrieved representation. Falsidical confabulation, in contrast,
occurs in cases in which the subject seems to remember, though
to remember inaccurately, and in which he is just making
things up, in the sense that, were the memory representation
accurate with respect to the target event, it would be so only
by chance. From an intuitive standpoint, in other words, neither
confabulation nor relearning is about retention. Confabulation is
about lack of reliability. Relearning is about lack of internality.
3.1.1. The Reliability Condition
Relearning will be discussed in Section 4. The remainder of
Section 3 develops the idea that confabulation is about lack of
reliability. Reliability is understood here in the epistemologist’s
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sense: a reliable system is, roughly, one that produces mostly
accurate representations. But reliability is not a purely statistical
notion, since even a reliable system might by chance produce
many inaccurate representations. It is thus a modal notion, and
a reliable system is, more precisely, one that tends to produce
mostly accurate representations, at least when operating under
normal conditions.
If simulationism is right, remembering is always at least in
part a matter of “making things up,” i.e., of generating a more
or less probable representation of a target event. In a loose
sense, then, we might say that all memories are to some extent
confabulatory. But there are different ways of making things
up, and, in a strict sense, we can distinguish between successful
remembering and confabulation in terms of the probability that
the generated representation is accurate. In a subject with a
properly functioning memory system, generated representations
have a high probability of being accurate. In a confabulating
subject, generated representations have a low probability of being
accurate. Confabulation, then, occurs when the subject’s episodic
memory system functions unreliably. When the system functions
unreliably, it will usually produce an inaccurate representation.
In cases where an unreliably functioning memory system
produces an inaccurate representation, the subject can be said
to confabulate falsidically. But even an unreliably functioning
systemmight occasionally produce an accurate representation. In
cases where an unreliably functioning memory system produces
an accurate representation, the subject can be said to confabulate
veridically5.
This approach to confabulation is broadly in line with
Hirstein’s definition in terms of the notion of “ill-groundedness,”
which may itself be understood in terms of reliability (Hirstein,
2005). It is meant to apply to core cases of clinical confabulation.
It is not, for example, satisfied by “lost in the mall” cases.6 But
though such cases are cited by Robins (2016a) as characteristic
examples of confabulation, they are importantly different from
clinical confabulation cases, so the fact that the definition is
not satisfied by them does not pose a problem. In a standard
“lost in the mall”-style experiment, the subject is asked to
imagine an episode in detail. Later, he mistakenly takes the
resulting representation to have originated in experience rather
than in imagination. Contrast this with a typical case of
clinical confabulation. The case of Dalla Barba’s patient SD is
representative. SD had suffered severe head trauma. When asked
what he had done the day before, he replied: “Yesterday I won
a running race and I was awarded with a piece of meat which
was put on my right knee” (Dalla Barba, 1993). This report was
inaccurate, the result of inappropriately recombining elements
from different events (SD had been a runner, and he had once
injured his right knee during a race). “Lost in the mall” cases
5On many approaches, confabulation, strictly speaking, arises only in cases of
amnesia due to brain lesions. Other approaches are available, but this article need
not adopt a definite account of the mechanisms (or breakdowns of mechanisms)
underlying confabulation: what matters, as far as the taxonomy is concerned, is
that all standard approaches will agree that confabulation, whatever its underlying
mechanism, always involves malfunction resulting in unreliability.
6When French et al. (2009) describe such cases as “a kind of confabulation in
nonclinical subjects,” they explicitly distance themselves fromHirstein’s definition.
certainly involve a kind of memory error, but the mechanism
responsible for the error is distinct from that at work in clinical
confabulation cases. In both “lost in the mall” cases and clinical
confabulation cases, the memory representation might turn out
by chance to be accurate but will normally be inaccurate. A
different explanation of the tendency of the representation to be
inaccurate is required in each sort of case. The inaccuracy in “lost
in the mall” cases is best described as resulting from a source
monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993) or other metacognitive error.
It is due to a failure at the level of metacognitive monitoring,
not at the level of the process responsible for generating the
representation. The inaccuracy in clinical confabulation cases, in
contrast, is due to a failure at the level of the process responsible
for generating the representation. It may be compounded by
metacognitive failure, but it results in the first place from a failure
of the episodic construction system to generate a representation
that is likely to be accurate.
The point can be put in epistemological terms. On many
accounts, when remembering is successful, episodic memory
provides the subject with two kinds of knowledge. The
remembered first-order content provides him with knowledge of
the target event. And accompanying meta-level autonoetic
phenomenology (Dokic, 2014) or self-reflexive content
(Fernández, 2016) provides him with knowledge that the
first-order content originates in his experience of the event.
Episodic memory, in other words, provides the subject both with
first-order knowledge of what happened in the past and with
meta-level knowledge of how he knows that it happened. Bearing
this characteristic feature of episodic memory in mind, it is easy
to explain the inclination to assimilate “lost in the mall” cases
to confabulation, for both such cases and clinical confabulation
cases involve inaccuracy at both the first-order level and the
meta-level: the subject forms a representation of an event that he
did not experience (first-order inaccuracy) and takes himself to
have experienced the represented event (meta-level inaccuracy).
Moreover, in both sorts of case, the meta-level inaccuracy is
due to meta-level error. In “lost in the mall” cases, the inaccuracy
arises because metacognitive monitoring misclassifies a first-
order representation as having originated in experience. This
might occur either because the subject applies inappropriate
source monitoring criteria or because he applies appropriate
source monitoring criteria that happen to be satisfied by the
representation. In either case, there is meta-level error, but
no meta-level malfunction: even a subject who reliably applies
appropriate criteria may occasionally apply inappropriate
criteria, and even appropriate criteria may occasionally
misclassify a representation. In clinical confabulation cases,
the inaccuracy arises because metacognitive monitoring fails
to detect problematic first-order generation processes. This is
meta-level error; it is not immediately clear whether it must
result from meta-level malfunction. An approach in the spirit
of Hirstein’s (2005) would restrict the scope of confabulation
to cases in which the subject applies inappropriate criteria and
does so due to meta-level malfunction. Similarly, Gilboa et al.
(2006) argue that confabulation occurs when subjects lose the
“feeling of rightness,” impairing their ability to evaluate memory
representations. Such an approach would rule out cases in which
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inappropriate criteria are applied (resulting in meta-level error)
but in which this is not due to malfunction, as well as cases
in which appropriate criteria are applied (but in which meta-
level error nevertheless occurs). This approach may be overly
restrictive, as it would classify as nonconfabulatory any condition
in which malfunction is restricted to the first-order level. For
example, if a subject with a malfunctioning memory system
who would normally detect problematic first-order processes
fails to do so on a particular occasion and therefore ends up
with an inaccurate memory belief, classifying his condition as
nonconfabulatory would obscure its similarity to paradigm cases
of confabulation.
Thus it may be preferable not to require meta-level
malfunction for confabulation. If so, then neither “lost in the
mall” cases nor clinical confabulation cases are characterized
by malfunction at the meta-level. We would thus have, in
both types of case, first-order and meta-level inaccuracy, where
the meta-level inaccuracy results from error which need not
itself result from malfunction. Nevertheless, it is also easy to
explain why the two types of case are distinct. In “lost in the
mall” cases, when the subject initially imagines an event, he
constructs a representation of an event that he did not experience,
but he is not attempting to construct a representation of an
event that he did experience. Here, inaccuracy does not result
from error, and the question of malfunction does not arise. In
clinical confabulation cases, in contrast, when the subject initially
imagines an event, he constructs a representation of an event
that he did not experience, but he is attempting to construct
a representation of an event that he did experience. Here,
inaccuracy results from error, and the error is due tomalfunction.
(In the case of SD, for example, the system recombines elements
in an unreliable manner, i.e., in a manner unlikely to produce
representations that are accurate with respect to the past.) In
short, while the first-order representations at issue in both sorts
of case are inaccurate, the inaccuracy in each case requires an
entirely different explanation. The difference is between cases in
which the failure results from a malfunctioning system and cases
in which the failure is a mere byproduct of a properly functioning
system.
3.1.2. Simulationism and Reliability
The type of memory error represented by “lost in the mall”
cases—which results from metacognitive error but implies
neither first-order nor meta-level malfunction—will be set aside
until section 4. Focusing for now on confabulation proper,
one might worry that, regardless of the plausibility of an
understanding of confabulation in terms of malfunction, such
an understanding is unavailable to the simulationist. As noted
above, Robins—citing De Brigard’s remark that “most of the time
what you recall accurately depicts the witnessed event. Sometimes
it does not. In both cases, however, the system is doing what
it is supposed to do” (De Brigard, 2014a, p. 172)—claims that
constructivists in general and simulationists in particular cannot
appeal to malfunction in order to explain memory errors, since
they “collapse the processing distinction between memory errors
and successful remembering” (Robins, 2016a, p. 441). But this is
true neither of De Brigard’s particular version of simulationism
nor of simulationism in general.
De Brigard’s suggestion that “in both cases . . . the system
is doing what it is supposed to do” appears to be due to
rhetorical excess. It is true that, on his version of simulationism,
inaccurate memory representations are an inevitable byproduct
of the proper functioning of the system, due to its probabilistic
character. But it is also true that he views the system as being
designed to produce accurate representations most of the time.
On this account, if the system (due, for example, to the sort of
brain injury often responsible for clinical confabulation) begins
to function in such a way that it no longer produces accurate
representations most of the time, then it is not functioning
properly, and De Brigard is not bound to say—and should not
say—that it is doing what it is supposed to do.
Other versions of simulationism likewise do not collapse the
processing distinction between memory errors and successful
remembering. Causal theorists define the proper function of
the system in terms of retention of information. Simulationists
do not do so, but this does not mean that they cannot
distinguish between proper function and improper function.
Instead of defining the proper function of the system in terms
of retention of information, they define it directly in terms of
reliability. One version of simulationism that makes this explicit
is Michaelian’s. In Michaelian (2011b), he argued that, if the
causal theory is to be able to distinguish accurately between
successful and unsuccessful remembering, the causal condition
must be supplemented by a reliability condition. As we will see
below, however, there is reason to think that, once a reliability
condition is added to the theory, the causal condition itself is
no longer necessary. Thus, in Michaelian (2016b), he advocates
replacing the causal reliabilist theory of memory with a pure
simulation theory. A rough formulation of his version of the
simulation theory says that to remember is to imagine (or
simulate) the past. A more precise formulation, however, says
that to remember is to imagine the past in a reliable manner.
Thus, the pure simulation theory might just as aptly be called a
pure reliabilist theory, and an understanding of confabulation in
terms of malfunction fits well with the theory.
3.2. A Provisional Simulationist Taxonomy
The definition of confabulation given above suggests a taxonomy
of memory errors in which the retention condition, which
requires retention of information from experience of the
represented event, is replaced by a reliability condition requiring
the reliable functioning of the episodic construction system (see
Table 2). Successful remembering occurs when both the reliability
condition and the accuracy condition are met. Misremembering
occurs when the reliability condition is met but the accuracy
condition is not. Veridical confabulation occurs when the
reliability condition is not met but the accuracy condition is met.
And falsidical confabulation occurs when neither the reliability
condition nor the accuracy condition is met.
The idea that misremembering satisfies the reliability
condition has not yet been discussed. This is discussed below,
but, before considering the place of misremembering in the
taxonomy, it will be helpful to clarify the relationship between
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TABLE 2 | A provisional simulationist taxonomy of memory errors.
Reliability Accuracy
Successful remembering Yes Yes
Misremembering Yes No
Veridical confabulation No Yes
Falsidical confabulation No No
reliability and retention. A system functions reliably when it
tends to produce mostly accurate representations, regardless of
what grounds this tendency. If the causal theory of memory is
right, the reliability of remembering is presumably due primarily
to the fact that the system retains information from experience of
remembered events. If the simulation theory is right, its reliability
is at least in some cases wholly due to the way in which the system
predicts or infers the features of past events.
There is nothing mysterious about the possibility of reliability
without retention. Consider episodic future thought, the future-
oriented counterpart to episodic memory. This is not the place
to attempt to establish that imagining the future is reliable. But it
might well be (seeMichaelian, 2016a), and, if we suppose that it is,
its reliability obviously cannot be explained in terms of retention,
for the simple reason that, since future events have not (yet)
been experienced, a subject cannot, when he imagines such an
event, draw on information retained from his experience of it.
The reliability of episodic future thought will, instead, have to
be explained in terms of factors such as the heuristics on which
the episodic construction system draws in order to predict the
features of future events. Providing a full explanation along these
lines would be no mean feat, but there is no obvious in-principle
barrier to doing so. Similarly, there is no in-principle barrier to
explaining the reliability of episodic memory in terms of factors
other than the retention of information from remembered events.
Even if there is nothing mysterious about reliability without
retention, it might seem that an explanation of reliability in terms
of retention will be more straightforward than any explanation
that the simulationist can offer. But this is not in fact the case. The
analogy between memory and perception will again be helpful
here.
3.2.1. Retention without Reliability
As noted in Section 2, just as the possibility of veridical
confabulation can be invoked to motivate the causal theory of
memory, the possibility of veridical hallucination can be invoked
to motivate the causal theory of perception. It is, however,
generally recognized that a causal condition by itself cannot
provide an adequate theory of perception. Various sorts of causal
connection might obtain between a perceptual representation
and its putative object, and not all of these are capable of
underwriting successful perception—some are “deviant.” The
following case illustrates the point (Pendlebury, 1994). Suppose
that Smith remains conscious while undergoing brain surgery.
He continues to have visual representations, but these result
exclusively from the surgeon’s activities. A crow flies across the
operating theater, startling the surgeon, who, as a result, bumps a
microelectrode inserted in Smith’s brain. By chance, this causes
Smith to have a visual representation of a crow flying across
the operating theater. Smith’s representation is not only veridical
with respect to the scene before his eyes but also caused by that
scene. A simple causal theory of perception will therefore classify
this as a case of successful perception. But despite the presence
of a causal connection between his perceptual representation and
the scene before his eyes, Smith is clearly not perceiving.
Parallel cases can easily be constructed for memory. Suppose
that Jones witnesses an accident involving a red car in front of his
office building but fails to encode any memory of the event. The
accident leads the police to set up a roadblock, which, in turn,
leads Jones to walk home from the office by a different route than
usual. The route happens to lead past the office of a hypnotist,
where Jones has himself hypnotized. The hypnotist implants in
him a memory of having witnessed an accident involving a red
car in front of his office earlier that day. When Jones arrives
home and his wife asks him about his day, the implantedmemory
causes him to form a memory representation of an accident
involving a red car occurring in front of his office building at
the relevant time. Jones’s representation is not only veridical with
respect to the event but also caused by it. A simple causal theory
will therefore classify this as a case of successful remembering.
But despite the presence of a causal connection between his
memory representation and the past event, Jones is clearly not
remembering7.
The point is that, in order to rule out deviant causal chains,
whether for perception or for memory, the causal condition
must be supplemented with a further condition. Causal theorists
of memory have often thought that memory traces can play
this role. There is some controversy over the precise nature of
memory traces (Sutton, 1998; De Brigard, 2014b). But regardless
of how we understand the nature of memory traces, the thought
is that a causal connection between an experienced event and
a later memory representation of the event is sufficient for
successful remembering only if it goes continuously via amemory
trace: the trace must be produced by the experience, it must
exist continuously during the interval between the time of the
experience and the time of the later representation, and it must
contribute to the production of the later representation. It is this
thought that is expressed by Robins’ retention condition, which
in effect combines the causal condition with the memory trace
condition.
Thememory trace condition rules out the deviant causal chain
in the hypnotist case just described. But causal theorists have
not generally appreciated that simply requiring that the causal
connection go continuously via a memory trace does not suffice
to rule out all deviant causal chains. As long as we think of the
trace as providing the full content of the later representation, it
might appear to do so. But once we acknowledge—as do most
contemporary causal theorists, including Robins—that the trace
need not provide the full content of the later representation,
it becomes clear that it does not. Take an ordinary case of
7This is inspired by a case discussed by Martin and Deutscher (1966) but differs
from it in making clear that there is a causal connection between the remembered
event and the action of the hypnotist.
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confabulation. When asked what he did the day before, Smith,
a subject with a malfunctioning memory system, generates an
inaccurate representation of the day. Now modify the case so
that a trace originating in his experience of the day makes
a minor contribution to the production of his representation.
Perhaps Smith spoke to his wife about a certain topic in a certain
location. Due to the influence of the trace, his representation
refers to a conversation with his wife. Due to the fact that his
memory system is malfunctioning, however, it misrepresents
the topic of the conversation and the location in which it took
place. Despite the influence of the trace, this is clearly not a
case of successful remembering. And it does not become a case
of successful remembering if we modify it further so that the
additional content generated by the confabulatory processes is
(coincidentally) veridical, rather than falsidical. If this is unclear,
we can reduce the contribution of the trace even further. Perhaps
the trace is responsible only for Smith’s representing that he did
something with his wife. Perhaps it is responsible only for his
representing that his wife wore a certain dress. At some stage,
it will become clear that, despite the influence of the trace, Smith
is not remembering. The point, again, is that the influence of a
trace does not suffice to rule out deviant causal chains. Once this
point is acknowledged—and it should be acknowledged by any
causal theorist who acknowledges the reconstructive character
of remembering, i.e., by any hybrid theorist—it becomes clear
that we must add a further condition to the causal theory. The
simplest such condition is a condition, along the lines of that
discussed above, requiring the reliable functioning of thememory
system.
3.2.2. Reliability without Retention
A number of causal theorists have come to a similar conclusion
about perception, suggesting that the causal condition be
supplemented with a reliability condition. Some have argued,
moreover, that, once the reliability condition is adopted, the
causal condition itself becomes redundant (see Kim, 1977). The
idea here is that, since the reliability condition is satisfied in any
case of successful perception, the causal condition does no work.
Some have argued, in fact, that, once the reliability condition is
adopted, it becomes clear that the the causal condition is not after
all a necessary condition on perception.
The idea here is that there are hypothetical cases in which a
subject perceives something even though his representation is
not caused by it. Consider the case of a subject who seems to
see through walls (Dretske, 1969). Smith seems to see through
a tall, thick, opaque wall, on the other side of which various
events unfold. When he faces the wall, the visual representations
he has are indistinguishable from those he would have were
the wall perfectly transparent. His visual representations are
reliably correlated with the objects on the other side of the
wall, but they are not caused by them. Intuitively, despite
the absence in this scenario of any causal connection between
Smith’s representations and their candidate objects, Smith sees
the objects. Or consider the case of a subject who seems to
see the future (Johnston, 2004). Jones seems to see what will
happen five minutes into the future in the direction in which he
is currently facing. When he faces in a given direction, the visual
representations he has are indistinguishable from those a normal
subject would have when similarly positioned five minutes later.
His visual representations are reliably correlated with events that
will unfold five minutes into the future, but they are not caused
by them. Again, intuitively, despite the absence of any causal
connection between Jones’s representations and their candidate
objects, Jones sees the objects.
If we are moved by these cases, we might well conclude
that, rather than supplementing the causal condition with a
reliability condition, we ought simply to replace the former
condition with the latter. Not all causal theorists will be so
moved, however. And for good reason: the cases in question
are purely hypothetical, and it is unlikely that we will be able
to identify a single plausible but realistic case of perception
without causation. In other words, there would appear to be
no real-life counterexamples to the necessity of causation for
perception. The situation with respect to memory, however, is
rather different, for it is much more plausible to hold that there
are real-life counterexamples to the necessity of causation for
memory. Perception without causation is utterly mysterious. It
is entirely unclear what sort of mechanism might, for example,
enable a subject to literally see the future. Memory without
causation is much less mysterious. Indeed, as we saw above,
it need not be at all mysterious. While it is entirely unclear
what sort of mechanism might enable a subject to literally see
the future, it is much easier to see what sort of mechanism
might enable him to reliably imagine the future. Much about
the workings of this mechanism remains to be explained, but we
have an increasingly good understanding of its basic principles
(Michaelian et al., 2016). And a mechanism that enables us
to reliably imagine the future might also enable us to reliably
imagine the past. Thus, while a theory of perception that rejects
the causal condition is not particularly plausible, a theory of
memory that rejects the causal condition is far more plausible,
and rejecting that condition is precisely what simulation theorists
propose to do.
3.3. Misremembering
The simulationist defines misremembering in terms of
reliability, rather than retention. According to the provisional
taxonomy outlined above, misremembering occurs when
the reliability condition is met but the accuracy condition
is not. This distinguishes it from (veridical and falsidical)
confabulation, in which the reliability condition is not
met. Confabulation, we have seen, indicates malfunction.
Misremembering, in contrast, is a byproduct of a properly
functioning memory system. Few of us, fortunately, are prone
to outright confabulation. But the sort of misremembering
captured by the DRM paradigm is a routine occurrence and
indicates no malfunction—it occurs when a reliable system
happens to produce an inaccurate representation. In DRM
studies, subjects who falsely recognize nonpresented lure
words typically also successfully recognize many presented
words.
Defining misremembering in terms of reliability, rather
than retention, provides simulationism with a key advantage
over causalism. The causalist sees misremembering as being
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characterized by retention and inaccuracy and falsidical
confabulation as being characterized by lack of retention and
inaccuracy. As we have seen, however, confabulation may
sometimes involve a degree of retention. In practice, the causalist
will thus have difficulty distinguishing between misremembering
and falsidical confabulation. Because he sees misremembering as
being characterized by reliability and inaccuracy and falsidical
confabulation as being characterized by unreliability and
inaccuracy, the simulationist, in contrast, is able to distinguish
between misremembering and falsidical confabulation
even where falsidical confabulation involves a degree of
retention.
It is important to note that, while the simulationist rejects the
causalist’s definition of misremembering in terms of retention,
simulationism is compatible with the view that remembering
often does involve retention: the simulationist’s claim is that
remembering does not necessarily involve retention, not that
it necessarily does not involve retention. This means that,
while simulationists are bound to reject Robins’ definition
of misremembering in terms of retention, they are free to
accept her explanation of the occurrence of misremembering
in terms of retention. As Robins observes, the particular
kind of inaccuracy that is involved in misremembering would
appear to be explicable only on the assumption that the
subject has retained information from the target event: an
explanation of the fact that the subject in a DRM experiment
falsely remembers a non-presented but thematically-consistent
lure word seems to require that the subject has retained
information about the theme of the presented words. Robins’
challenge to the simulationist was to explain the occurrence of
misremembering without invoking the retention of information.
But this is not a challenge that the simulationist need take
up. It is consistent with simulationism that, in every case of
misremembering, the subject has in fact retained information
from the target event. The simulationist argues that there are
cases of successful remembering that do not involve retention
of information, but he is free to say that some cases of
successful remembering do involve retention; and he is free to
say that the particular error of misremembering always involves
retention. The simulationist is thus able to acknowledge the
specific combination of success and failure that is characteristic of
misremembering.
An additional advantage of the simulationist approach is
that it better captures what misremembering has in common
with other errors that do not involve a breakdown in
reliability. On both De Brigard’s and Michaelian’s versions
of simulationism, remembering is a probabilistic process, in
the sense that the system attempts to predict the past on
the basis of presently available information. This allows the
approach to account for the kind of error involved in the
DRM effect in a straightforward manner, since the presence
of the falsely remembered word is likely given the presence
of the other words on the list. But it also allows it to begin
to account for the kind of error involved in “lost in the
mall” cases, since the occurrence of the falsely remembered
event is likely given that the subject now has a detailed
representation of it.
4. THE SIMULATIONIST TAXONOMY
The provisional taxonomy outlined in Section 3 provides
a plausible account of the relationships among successful
remembering, misremembering, falsidical confabulation, and
veridical confabulation. But it does not provide an account of the
relationships between these forms of successful or unsuccessful
remembering, on the one hand, and veridical and falsidical
relearning, on the other hand. In order to provide such an
account, an additional condition must be added to the taxonomy.
4.1. Relearning—The Internality Condition
As we saw above, relearning does not seem to be about accuracy
or inaccuracy. When a subject forms a memory on the basis of
reading a diary, for example, his memory representation might
or might not be accurate. Nor does it seem to be about reliability
or unreliability. When a subject forms a memory on the basis
of reading a diary, his memory process might or might not
be accurate. This will depend on a variety of factors, including
the nature of diary (e.g., whether it contains mostly accurate
information) and the manner in which he makes use of it (e.g.,
whether he is sensitive to the (in)accuracy of the information it
contains). Instead, relearning seems to be about failure to satisfy
an internality condition. Intuitively, veridical relearning occurs in
cases in which the subject seems to remember, and to remember
accurately, but in which he himself contributes no content
to the retrieved memory representation; falsidical relearning
occurs in cases in which the subject seems to remember,
though to remember inaccurately, and in which he himself
contributes no content to the retrieved memory representation.
After relearning has occurred, of course, the subject may satisfy
the internality condition and therefore subsequently remember
or misremember; failure to satisfy the internality condition is
characteristic of what happens at the time of relearning.
One way of satisfying the internality condition is to satisfy
the retention condition, and causalists will be inclined to equate
internality with retention, the thought being that what the
subject contributes, in the case of remembering, or fails to
contribute, in the case of relearning, is information retained
from his experience of the target episode. As we have seen,
however, the retention condition leads to difficulties with the
distinction between relearning and confabulation. Moreover,
satisfying the retention condition is not the only way of satisfying
the internality condition. For simulationists, what the subject
contributes, in the case of remembering, or fails to contribute,
in the case of relearning, is indeed information, but this
information need not be retained from his experience of the
target episode. In many cases, the subject will indeed contribute
retained information, but in other cases he may contribute
only information generated during the reconstructive retrieval
process. Similarly, in memory errors other than relearning, the
subject contributes (retained or generated) information.
4.2. A Revised Simulationist Taxonomy
Overall, then, the proposal is for a taxonomy which distinguishes
among remembering and misremembering, veridical and
falsidical confabulation, and veridical and falsidical relearning in
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FIGURE 1 | The simulationist taxonomy of memory errors.
TABLE 3 | The simulationist taxonomy of memory errors.
Internality Reliability Accuracy
Successful remembering Yes Yes Yes
Misremembering Yes Yes No
Veridical confabulation Yes No Yes
Falsidical confabulation Yes No No
Veridical relearning No Yes Yes
Falsidical relearning No Yes No
Veridical relearning No No Yes
Falsidical relearning No No No
terms of three conditions: accuracy, reliability, and internality.
Successful remembering occurs when all three conditions
are met. The various memory errors acknowledged by the
taxonomy occur when one or more of the conditions is not met,
in the pattern indicated in Table 3. Figure 1 provides a more
vivid depiction of the relationships among remembering and
misremembering, veridical and falsidical confabulation, and
veridical and falsidical relearning.
This approach to memory errors was first hinted at in
Michaelian (2016b), which suggested that confabulation might
be distinguished from the sort of everyday memory errors that
are exemplified by the DRM effect—what we have here been
referring to as misremembering—in terms of reliability. Robins
has recently objected to this suggestion, claiming, first, that the
simulationist approach predicts that memory errors are more
frequent in clinical subjects than in healthy subjects and, second,
that it is unclear whether errors are in fact more common in
clinical subjects than in healthy subjects.
Errors may be more common for clinical patients, or it may be
only that the errors produced are more noticeable or that reports
from such patients are met with more skepticism than everyday
attempts at remembering. Determining how many attempted
rememberings are errors, in either everyday or clinical cases, is
difficult outside of controlled experimental conditions (Robins,
Submitted).
This objection, however, rests on a misinterpretation of the role
of reliability in the simulationist approach.
Robins interprets the approach as claiming that “it is when
memory errors become more frequent—when they become the
rule rather than the exception—that the system changes from
functioning to malfunctioning. Michaelian’s account thus allows
us to say that the memory errors that occur in everyday cases
[such as DRM errors] are consistent with memory’s function
because they are outnumbered by cases where remembering
is reliable. Clinical confabulations, on the other hand, are
malfunctions because these errors are a more common result
of attempts at remembering” (Robins, Submitted). But this is
not what the approach claims. Simulationism says nothing about
the frequency of inaccurate representations in healthy or clinical
subjects but rather something about the tendency of certain
memory processes to produce inaccurate representations. What
simulationism claims is that the process at work when a subject
confabulates is unreliable, in the sense that it has a tendency
to produce inaccurate representations. If a given subject uses
that process most of the time, then he will under any realistic
circumstances end up with mostly inaccurate representations.
But a subject might do so more or less often, and so might
end up with more or fewer inaccurate memory representations.
Simulationism claims, further, that the process at work when
a subject misremembers is reliable, in the sense that it has a
tendency to produce accurate representations. If a given subject
uses that process most of the time, then he will under any realistic
circumstances havemostly accurate representations. But a subject
might do so more or less often, and so might end up with more
or fewer accurate memory representations. Thus, simulationism
does not claim that clinical subjects necessarily have inaccurate
memory representations more frequently than do healthy
subjects, only that, when a clinical subject confabulates, the
resulting memory representation tends to be inaccurate. In short,
simulationism by itself makes no predictions about the frequency
of inaccurate memory representations in clinical or healthy
subjects. That being said, simulationism does predict that, if
clinical subjects routinely confabulate, they will form inaccurate
memory representations more often than do healthy subjects.
While it may be difficult, outside of controlled experimental
conditions, to determine whether this prediction is satisfied, that
by itself does not tell against the simulationist taxonomy.
The simulationist taxonomy thus appears to be an
improvement over the causalist taxonomy, but there is certainly
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room for further improvement. The role of metacognitive
error, in particular, requires further investigation. As noted
above, Hirstein (2005) views metacognitive error as essential to
confabulation. That view can be challenged, but, regardless of
whether metacognitive error ultimately turns out to be strictly
speaking essential to confabulation, taking metacognitive error
into account will complicate the taxonomy. If we take it into
account, successful remembering will presumably require not
only internality, reliability, and accuracy but also adequate
metacognition. The type of error at issue in “lost in the mall”
cases will occur when the internality, reliability, and accuracy
conditions are met but the adequate metacognition condition
is not. If metacognitive error is essential to confabulation,
we will also have to acknowledge a type of memory error
which is like confabulation but which does not involve
metacognitive error. If metacognitive error is not essential
to confabulation, we will have to consider the relationship
between cases of confabulation that do satisfy the adequate
metacognition and cases that do not. The role or lack thereof
of metacognitive error in the other memory errors discussed
here—misremembering and relearning—will also need to be
investigated.
The errors discussed in the foregoing are all errors of
commission, and the role of errors of omission likewise requires
further investigation. Forgetting need not always amount to an
error (Michaelian, 2011a). But when it does, the internality,
reliability, and accuracy conditions would seem to be irrelevant.
Instead, “erroneous forgetting” would seem to occur when the
subject fails to produce a representation that he should have
produced. Erroneous forgetting might thus be characterized not
in terms of reliability, understood as a tendency to produce
mostly accurate representations, but rather in terms of the related
notion of power, understood as a tendency to produce many
accurate representations (Goldman, 1986). The roles of both
errors omission and metacognitive error are best left as questions
for future research.
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